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Although Dante incorporates many of the great 
medieval thinkers into his final canticle, few are 
more represented than Boethius in the Circle of 
Mars.  As we progress through Mars, we get a 
sense that Dante is using the ideas of Boethius 
as a support for himself as both a pilgrim and 
poet.  As a poet, Dante seems to be inspired by 
the connections between his life and the life of 
Boethius.  This connection is explored in deeper 
detail through a discourse on Fortune and 
wisdom.  For Boethius, an abandonment of the 
wheel of Fortune leads to a life devoted to the 
good.  In this way, Dante the poet identifies 
with Boethius’ initial bitterness to loss, but 
ultimate gain in transcending Fortune.  As a 
pilgrim, Dante develops intellectually as 
Cacciaguida recapitulates the Boethian solution 
to the problem between divine foreknowledge 
and human free will.  Indeed, the argument 
serves as a preparation for the pilgrim before his 
bittersweet future is revealed.  By the end of the 
journey through Mars, we see that Dante has 
combined these two perspectives through the 
Boethian claim that everything is done for the 
sake of the good. 
 There is no question of the presence of 
Boethius in the Circle of Mars.  As the poem 
makes clear, this realm is for the warriors and 
crusaders of Christianity who lost their lives for 
their faith.  While Boethius is already in the 
Circle of the Sun with the great sages, there is 
much in his life that shows similarities with 
someone like Cacciaguida.  In the tenth canto, 
Thomas Aquinas describes Boethius’ 
deliverance from suffering.  As Aquinas puts it, 
“to this peace / he came from exile and from 
martyrdom,” (Dante 123, ls. 128-129).  This 
description is nearly identical to the description  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cacciaguida gives of his own death in the 
fifteenth canto.  Cacciaguida claims that “from 
martyrdom I came to this, my peace” (182, l. 
148).  In seeing the similar description of these 
two figures, their identities take on a 
metaphorical unity.  That is to say, Cacciaguida 
becomes a sort of Boethian guide for Dante 
through the Circle of Mars.  It is fitting that, 
while Boethius is celebrated as one of the great 
thinkers, his archetype in Cacciaguida is the 
ideal leader for Dante as he moves through the 
realm of the crusaders. 
 The image of Boethius is also found in 
the life of Dante the poet.  We learn in The 
Consolation of Philosophy that Boethius is 
charged with bogus crimes and sentenced to 
exile and, eventually, death.  Boethius had 
enjoyed a comfortable life in politics, but, by the 
time of the Consolation, much had changed. 
“But now, five hundred miles away, mute and 
defenseless, I am condemned to proscription 
and death because of my concern for the safety 
of the Senate,” he tells Lady Philosophy 
(Boethius 13).  Boethius makes it quite clear 
that he is completely innocent.  He simply 
wanted to preserve the integrity of the Senate.  
In exchange for this, he is stripped of everything 
through his exile and forced to wait out his 
killing.  Further, Boethius laments the loss of his 
reputation.  Due to the charges brought against 
him, Boethius says that he “cannot bear to think 
of the rumors and various opinions that are now 
going around” (14).  The entire experience is 
humiliating and terrifying for Boethius. 
 The similarity between Boethius’ 
misfortunes and Dante’s life is brought out quite 
nicely in Cacciaguida’s prophecy of Dante’s 
future.  Cacciaguida tells Dante that, “as 
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Hippolytus was forced to flee from Athens / by 
his devious and merciless stepmother, / just so 
you too shall have to leave your Florence” 
(Dante 203, ls 46-48.)  This comparison works 
perfectly in evoking the sense of injustice in the 
action of driving Dante out of his beloved city.  
Just as Hippolytus was driven out of Athens due 
to his stepmother’s false charges against him, so 
Dante will be driven out of Florence for absurd 
reasons.  Like Boethius, Dante will abandon his 
cherished life in Florence.  Indeed, Dante’s 
ancestor warns him that he will “be forced to 
leave behind those things / you love most 
dearly” (204, ls 55-56).  Furthermore, the poet 
will go on to experience as much public 
humiliation as Boethius.  Cacciaguida tells 
Dante that “the public will, as always, blame the 
party / that has been wronged” (204, ls. 52-53).  
The phrase, “as always,” seems to be a subtle 
reminder of the similar injustice suffered by 
Boethius.  Seeing the connections in their lives, 
Dante must have felt some relief knowing that 
Boethius, one of his heroes, went through a 
similar ordeal. 
 Through the parallels Dante the poet 
weaves between himself and Boethius, the 
Circle of Mars becomes a sort of meditation on 
Fortune and wisdom.  We can see the formation 
of this meditation within the first lines of the 
fifteenth canto.  As the souls in Mars finish their 
song to God, Dante ponders how “right it is that 
he forever mourn / who out of love for what 
does not endure / loses that other love eternally”  
(178, ls. 10-12).   “That other love” can be seen 
as love of God, while the love that causes 
mourning is love of Fortune.  This dichotomy of 
loves can be traced back to Boethius’ 
definitions.  As Lady Philosophy grills Boethius 
over his loss of Fortune, she tells him that “you 
are wrong if you think that Fortune has changed 
toward you.  This is her nature, the way she 
always behaves.  She is changeable, and so in 
her relations with you she has merely done what 
she always does” (Boethius 21).  As Boethius 
points out, it is the very essence of Fortune to 
incessantly change.  Anyone who devotes her 
life to it will inevitably be heartbroken because 
fortune, which “does not endure,” will abandon 
her.  Boethius labels that which falls under the 
realm of Fortune as “limited things,” which “are 
not man’s path to happiness, nor can they make 
him happy in themselves” (55). 
 One of the many forms of Fortune that 
Dante criticizes and extracts from Boethius is 
that of a noble name.  In the beginning of the 
sixteenth canto, Dante the poet gives a sort of 
invective against the ignorance and vainglory of 
nobility. “Ah, trivial thing, our pride in noble 
blood!” he cries out in the very beginning of the 
canto (Dante 189, l.1).  This is basically a 
summary of Boethius’ scorn of fame and 
nobility in Book Three of the Consolation.  As 
Lady Philosophy discusses the lack of happiness 
in fame, she tells him that “everyone knows that 
to be called noble is a stupid and worthless 
thing…The praise of others (in this case, your 
parents) will not make you famous if you have 
no fame of your own” (Boethius 53).  For 
Boethius, nobility is just another guise that 
Fortune uses to seduce us.  It is something that 
carries no weight if an individual has done 
nothing virtuous to gain that nobility. Moreover, 
this kind of nobility is just as temporal as any 
other form of Fortune.  Dante makes this quite 
clear when exclaims, “Nobility, a mantle quick 
to shrink! / Unless we add to it from day to day, 
/ time with its shears will trim off more and 
more” (Dante 189, ls. 7-9).  One must not revel 
in the actions of his ancestors, but virtuously 
add to the “mantle” if he wants to enjoy the title 
of nobility. 
 Dante the poet incorporates this lesson 
through his confession of his pride of 
Cacciaguida.  When he is given the chance to 
talk to his ancestor, Dante “spoke again 
addressing him as ‘voi.’” (189, l. 10).  Dante is 
so caught up in the honor which shrouds his 
ancestor that he begins to use showy language 
that reflects his overzealousness.  As Dante’s 
guide, however, “Beatrice, not too far from us, / 
smiling, reminded me of her who coughed / to 
caution Guinevere at her first sign / of 
weakness” (189, ls. 13-15).    As a sort of Lady 
Philosophy for Dante, Beatrice reminds the 
pilgrim of the foolishness of his pride with such 
subtle power that he stops using the “voi” 
altogether.  In fact, the next time Dante speaks 
to Cacciaguida in the seventeenth canto, he 
speaks in more of an informal, intimate tone.  In 
terms of Dante the poet, this intervention on the 
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part of Beatrice seems to represent the poet’s 
discovery and change toward pride through the 
work of Boethius.  In other words, since Dante’s 
hostility toward noble pride is so similar to 
Boethius’ claims, I see this as Dante’s way of 
showing how important Boethius was in 
spiritually guiding the poet beyond the woes of 
Fortune, especially during his exile. 
 Another example that shows the 
decadence of Fortune is the representation of the 
decay of Florence.  Dante uses his 
denouncement of noble pride as a foundation for 
the portrayal of his former home.  Cacciaguida’s 
account of the fallen families reflects this.  He 
tells us that, if we consider the fall of several 
great ancient cities, “you should not find it hard 
to understand / or strange to hear that families 
dwindle out / when even cities pass away in 
time” (Dante 191, ls. 76-78).  For Cacciaguida, 
the ephemeral nature of civilization is magnified 
in the fall of noble families.  As Robert 
Hollander puts it, “If cities show such mortal 
tendencies, reflects Cacciaguida, how much 
more subject to mortality are mere families? 
(Hollander 446)” This harmonizes well with the 
subtle admonishment Beatrice has just given the 
pilgrim.  The lesson of humility toward nobility 
given by Beatrice to Dante is expanded to the 
entire noble sphere of Florence in the rest of the 
canto.  Just as Dante’s pride in his ancestor 
reflects a reliance on Fortune, so the city’s 
decay reflects its devotion to that which does 
not endure.  “And as the turning of the lunar 
sphere / covers and then uncovers ceaselessly / 
the shore,” Dante tells us, “so Fortune does with 
Florence now” (Dante 191, ls. 82-84).  Like the 
circular process of the tides moving in and 
receding, the wheel of Fortune raises the city up 
only to drop it. 
The point of this can be traced to 
Boethius.  Dante is chronicling all of these 
Florentine noble families as fallen from their 
originally happy states.  Like Lady Philosophy, 
Dante the poet seems to be reminding himself 
that everyone, at one point or another, is subject 
to the ways of Fortune.  He seems to be going 
back to Boethius, who tells us that all of 
Philosophy’s past followers have had to suffer.  
Furthermore, the decadence of Florence reflects 
the Boethian notion that those who are too taken 
by their noble name, who are so enveloped in 
Fortune, suffer the greatest.  At one point 
Cacciaguida exclaims, “How great I saw them 
once who now are ruined / by their own pride 
(192, ls. 109-110)!”  Again, Dante the poet 
seems to be lamenting that the depravity of his 
city is an all-too-clear example of Boethius’ 
claims. 
 There are also many indications of how 
the ideas of Boethius influence and 
intellectually develop Dante the pilgrim in the 
Circle of Mars.  This is shown best in the 
seventeenth canto, where Cacciaguida discusses 
the relation between divine foreknowledge and 
human free will.  The pilgrim, having traveled 
through Inferno and Purgatorio, wants 
Cacciaguida to tell him what his future entails.  
As the pilgrim points out, “you see, gazing upon 
the final Point / where time is timeless, those 
contingent things / before they ever come into 
true being” (203, ls. 16-18).  God, the “final 
Point,” does not see things according to a 
temporal sequence.  Rather, God sees 
everything at the same time in an eternal 
present.  Boethius makes the same claim when 
he argues that, “since God lives in the eternal 
present, His knowledge transcends all 
movement of time and abides in the simplicity 
of its immediate present” (Boethius 116).  For 
God, all time is perceived at the same time.  
Since the members of Heaven continually gaze 
at God, they too can perceive everything in the 
eternal present. 
 This distinction, however, brings up a 
major philosophical problem that has plagued 
thinkers for a long time.  If God can foresee all 
of our actions, then do we really have free will?  
The question becomes especially important in 
light of the poem, as the pilgrim’s future actions 
seem to be preordained in the prophecy of 
Cacciaguida.  As we have seen, however, Dante 
must choose to be virtuous if he wants to enjoy 
any sense of nobility or holiness.  If it is 
predestined for Dante to act the way does, can 
he really be held accountable for the good or 
bad he does? If men cannot choose freely, then 
concepts of reward and punishment break down, 
since their chosen actions are mere illusions.  
Furthermore, Boethius points out that prayer 
would be meaningless, “for what is the point in 
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hope or prayer when everything that man 
desires is determined by unalterable process? 
(Boethius 107)” An ideal solution to this 
problem would allow for God to retain his 
foreknowledge and humans to keep their free 
will. 
 In the Consolation, Boethius gives such 
a solution.  Lady Philosophy starts the argument 
by reinforcing the importance of human free 
will. In this way, Boethius the philosopher is 
able to literally build up from human nature to 
God’s nature.  For Boethius, being a rational 
human being implies having free will, “for any 
being, which by its nature has the use of reason, 
must also have the power of judgment by which 
it can make decisions and, by its own resources, 
distinguish between things which should be 
desired and things which should be avoided” 
(103).  We all have the power of judgment, and 
we know we can choose what is good or bad, so 
we must have free will. 
 If we do have free will, how is this 
reconciled with God’s foreknowledge?  
Boethius’ answer is crucial to understanding 
Dante’s seventeenth canto. The argument is 
preceded by the idea that “everything which is 
known is known not according to its own power 
but rather according to the capacity of the 
knower” (110).  Before Boethius gives his 
argument for a compatibility between 
foreknowledge and free will, he emphasizes our 
severely limited epistemological capacities.  
From our perspective, we think that, if our 
future actions are known with certainty, they are 
wholly necessary.  Our knowledge of the world 
is bound by the process of time and causality.  
God’s knowledge, on the other hand, is not 
bound by anything, since He exists beyond 
space and time.   
Boethius’ solution to the problem is 
based on the fact that God exists in an eternal 
present.  For Boethius, God’s knowledge 
“encompasses the infinite sweep of past and 
future, and regards all things in its simple 
comprehension as if they were now taking 
place” (116).   Since God is outside of space and 
time, He perceives everything beyond the 
bounds that confine human perception.  
Boethius makes the interesting claim that God 
doesn’t actually foresee anything, since there is 
no sense of temporal procession in His 
perceptions.  Instead, God distinguishes things 
by His knowledge of the eternal present in 
which He exists.  Since God doesn’t have 
foreknowledge in the way we think of it, His 
providence “does not change the nature and 
properties of things; it simply sees things 
present before it as they will later turn out to be 
in what we regard as the future” (117).  
Moreover, God is able to perceive all possible 
actions with the necessary actions.  This 
includes actions which may never even occur.  
Therefore, God is able to see what can come 
about through both necessity and human free 
will without interfering in the contingency 
required for free will. 
Cacciaguida seems to notice that, if 
Dante cannot be held accountable for his 
actions, the divine command to write the 
Commedia is meaningless.  This is why he 
provides the Boethian argument for a 
compatibility between divine foreknowledge 
and human free will before he grants Dante’s 
request to hear his future.  He starts his speech 
by saying that “contingency, which in no way 
extends / beyond the pages of your world of 
matter, / is all depicted in the eternal sight” 
(Dante 203, ls. 37-39).  Like Boethius, 
Cacciaguida claims that God can see all 
potential actions, even the ones that never come 
into being.  This ties in with what the pilgrim 
says earlier in the canto concerning those who 
look “upon the final Point” and see everything 
before it has come into being.  Just as we can 
process certain mathematical laws, so 
Cacciaguida can see in the eternal present 
everything that will happen in the future.   
Like Boethius, Dante wants to show that 
the eternal sight of these contingencies does not 
impose necessity on them.  As Cacciaguida puts 
it, “this no more confers necessity / than does 
the movement of a boat downstream / depend 
upon the eyes that mirror it” (203, ls. 40-42).   
Just as a man who watches a moving boat 
doesn’t control its course, so God watches our 
actions without interfering with our free will.  
Dante’s analogy is similar to the questions 
Philosophy poses against Boethius’ claims. 
After showing him that God perceives in an 
eternal present, Lady Philosophy asks, “Why 
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then do you imagine that things are necessary 
which are illuminated by this divine light, since 
even men do not impose necessity on the things 
they see?  Does your vision impose any 
necessity upon things which you see present 
before you? (Boethius 117)” Boethius is 
emphasizing the logical inconsistency in the 
notion that God foresees and therefore imposes 
necessity on all actions.  Since He is in a state 
where there is no past or future, and perceives 
all necessarily occurring actions along with 
those that may or may not happen, God does not 
hinder human free will through His perception.  
Dante the poet’s analogy allows both his readers 
and the pilgrim to easily conceptualize the 
complicated solution offered by Boethius. 
While Cacciaguida’s introduction 
preserves a sense of freedom in Dante’s actions 
in the prophecy, it also seems to be an 
intellectual preparation for the pilgrim.  Indeed, 
the account of Dante’s future life is quite 
devastating.   By giving the Boethian solution to 
the problem of divine foreknowledge before the 
bittersweet prophecy, Cacciaguida shows the 
pilgrim that God won’t unjustly heap misfortune 
on Dante.  In a way, the poet seems to associate 
contingency, which doesn’t go beyond “the 
pages of your world of matter,” with Fortune, 
which “does not endure.”  As we’ve seen, Dante 
the poet and Boethius discourage a dependence 
on the ways of Fortune, since it never makes 
men entirely happy.  In this subtle way, then, 
Cacciaguida precedes his lengthy speech with 
the ideas of Boethius to assure the pilgrim that 
any calamity that follows in the prophecy is yet 
another instance of the turning of the wheel of 
Fortune.   
Boethius not only serves as a consolation 
for the pilgrim and the poet, but also as a 
connector of the two perspectives.  At one point 
in the Consolation, Lady Philosophy tells 
Boethius that “everything is governed by its 
own proper order directing all things toward the 
good” (93).  Nothing describes the overarching 
Boethian solace in the Paradiso better than this.  
Although there are discords in Dante’s life, 
Boethius assures him as both a poet and pilgrim 
that it is all for the good.  For Dante the pilgrim, 
a break from the prosperity of life in Florence 
seems detrimental, but it will actually help the 
poet to direct his passions toward God and 
writing the Commedia.  The pilgrim can come 
to terms with his prophecy by acknowledging 
the temporality of the dissonance in his coming 
life.  As Hollander put it, “no matter how 
discordant the sounds of his great-great-
grandson’s coming travails may seem, 
Cacciaguida would seem to be insisting, they 
will eventually be heard as harmony, at least 
once Dante’s task is completed” (Hollander 
470).  Looking at the poem through a Boethian 
lens reveals how the perspectives of the poet 
and pilgrim dissolve into a singular progression 
toward the good. 
The references to Boethius in the Circle 
of Mars are myriad.  He becomes a source of 
intellectual aid for Dante the poet and pilgrim.  
From the biographical connections between 
Dante and Boethius evolves a meditation on the 
inevitability of misfortune.  Indeed, Dante’s 
pride in his nobility is amplified by his beloved 
city’s devotion to that “which does not endure.”  
Boethius, however, reminds us of the goodness 
in transcending the ups and downs of the wheel 
and directing one’s passion toward the good.  
Through Cacciaguida’s elegant review of 
Boethius solution to the problem between divine 
foreknowledge and human free will, the pilgrim 
is guaranteed his free will and given a subtle 
encouragement to endure through the hardships 
that will end beyond the world of matter.  Taken 
together, we can see how Dante ingeniously 
joins the perspectives of the poet and pilgrim 
through the Boethian claim that all is done for 
the good.  By the end of this thought-provoking 
Circle, the ideas of Boethius not only console 
Dante, but also encourage the reader to look 
beyond the ever-spinning wheel of Fortune. 
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